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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brittany Lonj 'e Jones appeals from her conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine,
challenging the district court's denial of her motion to suppress. The district court erred in
denying Ms. Jones's motion to suppress because the officer who observed her driving in the left
lane of the interstate at ten miles per hour below the posted speed limit, did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe she had committed a traffic violation by impeding traffic because road signs
instructed all through traffic to travel in the left lane. In addition, the officer's observations of
Ms. Jones both before and after the traffic stop did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity sufficient to justify an extension of the stop for a drug investigation. The district court
should have granted Ms. Jones's motion to suppress, and excluded the evidence found during the
search of her vehicle.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
There is a section ofl-15 just south ofldaho Falls, where the speed limit changes from 80
miles per hour to 65 miles per hour, and signs instruct all northbound through traffic to travel in
the left lane. (Tr., p.18, Ls.I-IO, p.82, Ls.14-18; R., p.148; De£ Exs. A, B, C.) Ms. Jones, who is
black, was driving in the left lane on this section of the interstate in December 2017, in an SUV
with California license plates, heading north to Montana. (R., pp.148-49; State's Ex. 1; Con£
Exs., pp.3, 9.)
Ms. Jones saw a marked patrol car, applied her brakes, and slowed to approximately 55
miles per hour. (Tr., p.23, Ls.6-18; R., p.149.) The driver of the patrol car, Officer Vance Cox,
followed Ms. Jones's vehicle for approximately three miles and did not observe any swerving or
erratic driving. (R., p.149.) Officer Cox decided to pull Ms. Jones's vehicle over because he
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believed she was impeding the flow of traffic by driving too slowly in the left lane, in violation
ofldaho Code§ 49-630(2). (Tr., p.21, L.17 - p.18, L.2; R., p.149; Conf. Exs., pp.45, 47.) Officer
Cox acknowledged at the suppression hearing that he was not aware of the signs instructing all
through traffic to travel in the left lane. (Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.14.)
Officer Cox approached Ms. Jones's vehicle from the passenger side and explained the
reason for the stop. (R., p.149.) He testified that Ms. Jones's hands were shaking, and she had
bloodshot eyes and appeared nervous. (R., p.149.) Ms. Jones's speech was not slurred, however,
and the officer did not smell alcohol or marijuana. (Tr., p.69, Ls.11-24.) Ms. Jones told the
officer she had rented the vehicle in California and was driving to Montana to visit her
boyfriend. (R., p.149.) Officer Cox testified he was suspicious of drug activity and believed
Ms. Jones might be a drug courier based on her reaction to the stop, her story, and the fact that
she did not have a coat and was wearing sandals despite the cold weather. (R., p.149.)
At one point, Ms. Jones opened the center console and Officer Cox observed a knife and
small flakes of what he believed to be marijuana (later determined not to be marijuana.)
(R., p.150; Conf Exs., p.4; Tr., p. 70, L.18 - p. 71, L.1.) Officer Cox believed Ms. Jones could be
under the influence of marijuana. (R., p.150.) He confirmed Ms. Jones's license and registration
were valid, but nonetheless requested a drug dog. (R., p.150.) While awaiting the drug dog,
Officer Cox gave Ms. Jones a written warning for impeding traffic. (R., p.150.) He then ordered
Ms. Jones out of the vehicle and conducted field sobriety tests for suspected marijuana use.
(Tr., p.38, Ls.2-18; R., p.150.) During the testing, the canine unit arrived (24 minutes after the
initial stop). (R., p.150.) The canine alerted and a pound of methamphetamine was found in the
vehicle. (R., p.150.)
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Ms. Jones was charged by Information with one count of drug trafficking in
methamphetamine or amphetamine, 400 grams or more, and one count of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substance (DUI);
and the State alleged the DUI was Ms. Jones's second offense within ten years. (R., pp.50-52.)
Ms. Jones filed a motion to suppress arguing the officer who stopped her vehicle lacked
reasonable suspicion for the stop, impermissibly expanded the stop into a drug investigation, and
prolonged the stop to wait for a drug dog. (R., pp.60-61, 92-102.) Following a hearing, the
district court denied Ms. Jones's motion to suppress. (R., pp.148-55.)
Ms. Jones then entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
1 l(f)(l)(C). (R., pp.178-81.) Ms. Jones agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of
trafficking in methamphetamine (28 grams or less), reserving her right to appeal from the denial
of her motion to suppress, and the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the DUI charge and
enhancement. (R., p.178.) The parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of four years
fixed, with the indeterminate portion open for argument. (R., p.178.) The district court accepted
Ms. Jones's guilty plea, and sentenced her to a unified term of six years, with four years fixed.
(Tr., p.115, L.10 - p.116, L.10, p.133, Ls.19-22; R., p.192.) The judgment of conviction was
entered on September 13, 2019, and Ms. Jones filed a timely notice of appeal on October 10,
2019. (R., pp.194-96, 198-200.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Jones's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Jones's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Ms. Jones's motion to suppress for two reasons. First,

the stop of Ms. Jones's vehicle violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment because Officer
Cox lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Ms. Jones was violating Idaho Code § 49-630(2) at
the time of the stop. Even if Ms. Jones was driving in the left lane at less than the normal speed
of traffic, she was driving in the only lane available for through traffic, and was thus not
violating § 49-630(2). Second, Officer Cox's observations of Ms. Jones both before and after the
stop did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an extension of
the stop for a drug investigation. Officer Cox thus violated Ms. Jones's rights under the Fourth
Amendment by continuing to detain her after issuing a written warning for impeding traffic. This
Court should vacate Ms. Jones's conviction, reverse the district court's order denying her motion
to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). "This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found." Id. (citations omitted). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
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factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
The interpretation of a statute presents a legal question over which this Court exercises
free review. State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 106 (2015). Statutory construction "must begin with
the literal words of the statute" and "those words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary
meaning." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Jndep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003)
(citations omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply
follows the law as written." Id. (citation omitted).

C.

Officer Cox Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Believe Ms. Jones Violated Idaho
Code§ 49-630(2) Because She Was Driving In The Only Lane Available For Through
Traffic
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. A
traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but can be justified if (1) an
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver has committed an offense, such as a
traffic offense, or (2) an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged
in other criminal activity, such as driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho
439, 442 (2015).
Officer Cox stopped Ms. Jones' s vehicle because he believed she was impeding the flow
of traffic by driving too slowly in the left lane, in violation of § 49-630(2). (Tr., p.21, L.17 p.18, L.2, p.68, Ls.14-18; R., p.149; Con£ Exs., pp.45, 47.) This statute states, in pertinent part:
Upon all highways any vehicle proceeding at less than normal speed of traffic at
the time and place and under the conditions then existing, shall be driven in the
right-hand lane available for traffic . . . except when overtaking and passing
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another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left tum
at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.
I.C. § 49-630(2).
Ms. Jones argued in the district court that Officer Cox did not have reasonable suspicion
to believe she violated this statute because she was driving on a portion of the interstate where
signs instructed all northbound through traffic to travel in the left lane. (Tr., p.18, Ls.1-10, p.82,
Ls.14-18; R., p.148; Def Exs. A, B, C.) Officer Cox admitted at the suppression hearing that he
was not aware of this signage. (Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.14.) He said he would have stopped
Ms. Jones even ifhe had been aware of the signage, however, "[b]ecause the traffic sign ... says
'thru traffic stay left,' but it does not say that you can impede traffic or drive under the speed
limit." (Tr., p.26, Ls.15-22.)
The district court agreed with the prosecutor that Officer Cox had reasonable suspicion to
believe Ms. Jones violated § 49-630(2) because Ms. Jones was "impeding the flow of traffic."
(R., p.152.) The district court erred. Even if Ms. Jones was impeding the flow of traffic by
driving in the left lane at ten miles per hour below the speed limit, the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe she violated § 49-630(2) because she was driving in the only lane available
to northbound through traffic.
This Court must interpret § 49-630(2) to determine whether Ms. Jones committed a
traffic violation by arguably driving at less than the normal speed in the left lane. Ms. Jones did
not violate this statue because she was driving in the only lane available for through traffic. The
statute states a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic "shall be driven in the
right-hand lane available for traffic." LC. § 49-630(2). At the time Officer Cox observed
Ms. Jones, she was driving in the only lane available for through traffic, which was the left lane.
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The right lane was not available for through traffic because signs directed all through traffic into
the left lane.
This reading of§ 49-630(2) is consistent with Idaho Code § 49-801(1), which states, in
pertinent part, that "[t]he driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any traffic-control
device placed or held in accordance with the provisions of this title, unless otherwise directed by
a peace officer .... " (See R., p.141.) Ms. Jones would have violated§ 49-801(1) if she had
disobeyed the traffic-control device-specifically, the road signs which instructed all northbound
through traffic to travel in the left lane. This Court need not look at the language of a particular
section of a statute in a vacuum. See Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897
(1992). It would not make sense for Ms. Jones to be required by § 49-6302(2) to drive in the
right lane, while simultaneously being required by§ 49-801(1) to drive in the left lane.
Officer Cox did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Ms. Jones violated§ 49-6302(2)
because, even if she was impeding traffic by driving ten miles per hour under the speed limit, she
was driving in the only lane available for through traffic.

D.

Officer Cox's Observations Of Ms. Jones Both Before And After The Stop Did Not
Provide Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity Sufficient To Justify An Extension
Of The Stop For A Drug Investigation
"Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative

detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)."

State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012) (citations omitted). "An investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Where an officer abandons the initial purpose of a
routine traffic stop, "the extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot." Id. (citations omitted). "A reasonable suspicion exists when the officer ... can
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articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal activity is occurring." Id. at 409-10 (citation omitted).
"The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615
(Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted).
Ms. Jones argued in the district court that Officer Cox violated her rights under the
Fourth Amendment by detaining her for a drug investigation after issuing her a written warning
for impeding traffic. (R., p.146.) The district court concluded Officer Vance had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to expand the traffic stop into a drug investigation based on the
totality of the circumstances. (R., pp.152-54.) The district court clearly erred. In explaining its
conclusion, the district court said:
Vance observed that Defendant was nervous, shaking, and had blood shot eyes.
Vance also observed indicia of Defendant being a drug courier. Particularly
compelling is Vance's observation of green material in the vehicle which
appeared to Vance ... to be marijuana fragments.
(R., pp.152-53.) These factors do not reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal activity was
occurrmg.
The first factor relied upon by the district was the fact that Ms. Jones was nervous, and
had shaking hands and bloodshot eyes. (R., pp.152-53.) These factors do not suggest Ms. Jones
was impaired, and are entirely reasonable considering the fact that she was driving from
California to Montana, alone, and had just been stopped by a police officer for driving too slowly
in the left lane. (Tr., p.21, L.17 - p.18, L.2; R., p.149; Con£ Exs., pp.45, 47.) See, e.g., Neal, 159
Idaho at 924 ("A nervous demeanor during an encounter with law enforcement is of limited
significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion because it is common for people
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to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal
activity.").
The next factor relied upon by the district court was the "indicia" of being a drug courier
testified to by Officer Cox. (R., pp.152-53.) Officer Cox testified he suspected Ms. Jones might
be a drug courier because of certain "pre-stop indicators" which he identified as "the fact that ...
that she became rigid and leaned back, was 10:00 and 2:00, applied the brakes, and slowed
below the speed limit when she wasn't speeding to begin with .... " (Tr., p.25, Ls.8-17.) These
are indicators of someone trying to improve their driving after seeing a patrol car following
them; they are not indicators of criminal activity, and they are certainly not indicators of drug or
alcohol use.
Lastly, the district court found it "[p ]articularly compelling" that Officer Vance observed
what he believed to be marijuana fragments. (R., pp.152-53.) This is not a particularly
compelling factor considering the fact that the officer did not smell marijuana, and did not
observe any drug paraphernalia. (See Tr., p.69, Ls.11-24.) The marijuana fragments of course
turned out not to be marijuana fragments. (R., p.150; Con£ Exs., p.4; Tr., p.70, L.18 - p.71, L.1.)
The fact that Ms. Jones had unknown green flecks in her car cannot support a finding of
reasonable suspicion of drug activity.
Officer Cox testified at the suppression hearing that he "was suspicious right off the bat"
that Ms. Jones might under the influence of marijuana. (Tr., p.29, Ls.17-22.) This suspicion was
based on nothing more than a hunch. The hunch might have stemmed from Ms. Jones' s race, or
her out-of-state license plates, but it cannot be upheld by this Court as providing a
constitutionally reasonable basis for a drug investigation. See Neal, 159 Idaho at 925 (stating an
officer's hunch "is not sufficient to meet the stringent requirements of the Fourth Amendment").
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None of the factors discussed by the district court, considered alone or together, bear more than
minimal significance in a reasonable suspicion analysis. Because Officer Cox did not have
constitutionally reasonable suspicion to initiate a drug investigation, the district court should
have held he violated Ms. Jones's rights under the Fourth Amendment by detaining her after
issuing her a warning for impeding traffic.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Jones respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction, reverse the district
court's order denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2020.

Isl Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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